The Campbell Soup Company (“Campbell’s”) can now tell its competitors, “No CHUNKY soup for you!”  Earlier this month, Campbell’s earned the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) approval to trademark the word “CHUNKY.”  Campbell’s has long used the word to describe its more ingredient-filled soups, but now the Camden, New Jersey-based soup giant can officially add CHUNKY to its extensive list of registered trademarks.  Not only is it a major windfall for a soup company to own the rights to a word often used to describe the texture and look of soup, but it is a rare accomplishment, and Campbell’s has pop culture, its lengthy relationship with the National Football League (“NFL”), and years of successful advertising to thank.

Generally, marks considered merely descriptive of the goods for which they are associated cannot be protected until these marks achieve secondary meaning.  A mark is considered merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the specified goods or services.   Secondary meaning is accomplished when consumers have come to identify a mark with a specific product over time.  While CHUNKY could be a word used to describe the hodgepodge of extra vegetables, pasta, and meat stuffed into some of Campbell’s soups, Campbell’s successfully demonstrated secondary meaning by citing to “massive unsolicited media coverage” of CHUNKY in its trademark application.  Over the years, CHUNKY has been parodied on Saturday Night Live, Family Guy, The Simpsons, and The Daily Show.  Campbell’s also reportedly spent $1 billion in advertising since 1988, including its NFL sponsorship, and put out commercials featuring NFL players like Reggie White and Donovan McNabb eating the CHUNKY line of Campbell’s soup.    Rapper Ghostface Killah referenced the soup in his lyrics to “Murda Goons” (“Leave your brain all chunky like I’m advertising soup from Campbell’s”) and Pulitzer-Prize winning author Colson Whitehead said in his novel, Sag Harbor, “We were Campbell’s men, had been for years, and nothing took the edge off like the talent in their boutique Chunky line…”  Campbell’s also presented a survey showing that 75 percent of consumers associated the word “chunky” with the soup.  In the end, the USPTO agreed that CHUNKY had achieved secondary meaning in the eyes of consumers, and granted Campbell’s the trademark rights.

But what does this mean for other companies looking to possibly use the word chunky to describe food products?  Campbell’s has reportedly said that the word will be limited in connection with soups – not other food products.  For example, a food product called “Chunky Muffins” would not violate Campbell’s trademark.  Additionally, Campbell’s has said that “non-prominent, descriptive” uses of the word, such as “chunky-style,” that are not a trademark, will not be a violation.  Finally, trademark applicants can learn a thing or two from Campbell’s CHUNKY victory.  Trademark applicants should be reminded of the importance of making meaningful and memorable connections with consumers through multiple avenues for not just products, but words used to describe products.  For it is especially through unique and standout marketing that a mark can achieve the secondary meaning necessary to secure an even stronger position in the marketplace.

The issue of intellectual property used within video games is in the news again. If you haven’t already heard, wildly popular video game Fortnite features a dance called “Swipe It” that is the center of a pending lawsuit. Brooklyn-based rapper 2 Milly is claiming he created the dance in 2015 and the game’s creators swiped it from him. 2 Milly, whose real name is Terrence Ferguson, filed the lawsuit in federal court in Los Angeles against Epic Games, the maker of Fortnite, alleging copyright infringement, right of publicity, and unfair competition claims.  Additionally, the lawsuit accuses Epic Games of appropriating several dances in Fortnite (“emotes”) without permission, including Alfonso Ribeiro’s “Carlton Dance” from “The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air” (renamed Fresh), Snoop Dogg’s 2004 dance from “Drop It Like It’s Hot” (retitled “Tidy”), and Donald Faison’s dance from the TV show “Scrubs,” (renamed “Dance Moves”).

2 Milly’s dance, dubbed the “Milly Rock,” consists of a left arm swing, a right arm swing, a circular motion of both arms, and simultaneous alternative hip swings – repeated over and over again.  But is it copyrightable?  To successfully state a copyright infringement claim and collect damages, 2 Milly will generally have to show that he owns a valid copyright to the dance and that Epic Games copied constituent elements of the dance that are original. There is also the question of whether Fortnite’s Swipe It dance infringes on 2 Milly’s brand as an artist. After all, 2 Milly became known and recognized for his Milly Rock dance and gained fame and popularity for it on a viral level. While the Fortnite avatars participating in the dances do not use 2 Milly’s name and do not appear to look like 2 Milly, there could be an argument that the use of Swipe It infringes on the rapper’s likeness and persona as an artist, who is particularly known for a particular dance. On top of all of this, Epic Games gains a commercial advantage by its use of Swipe It since gamers are prompted to pay approximately $9.50 to “unlock” the Swipe It emote on Fortnite.

While a dispute over the ownership of a dance move portrayed in a video game may seem novel, it is part of a long trend of similar past – and most likely future – disputes. Indeed, the 2 Milly lawsuit was followed shortly thereafter by a lawsuit from Alfonso Ribeiro. Copyright infringement lawsuits have been filed and some are currently pending from tattoo artists against video game studios over the reproduction of players’ tattoos in games. College athletes have battled over the unpaid use of their likenesses in college sports video games. Even Lindsay Lohan tried to sue Rockstar Games over the use of a character she says was based on her likeness.

As video games become more realistic and more intertwined with popular culture (and social media), the issues of intellectual property being used within other intellectual property will show their face again and again. This is especially true as game studios push virtual reality and as consumers expect to see their real worlds reproduced faithfully in video game format. Intellectual property licensing has been a part of the video game world for a long time. But as the content being incorporated into those games transitions from traditional properties like music and brands to more nebulous properties like dance moves and personal likenesses, creators on both sides of the divide need to be aware of their rights and need to be aware of where their properties are being used. In many circumstances, the law is unsettled or there are issues of first impression. Creators who sleep on their rights may miss out on potential revenue streams or may risk the loss of their rights to the public domain. Creators who utilize third-party works may face disruptions or event litigation as works they thought were in the public domain are claimed by their creators. Intellectual property licensing is here to stay in the video game world, and those who are aware of this fact and use it to their advantage are more likely to find themselves in the winner’s circle.

 

Hasbro, Inc. recently made headlines when it received a federal trademark registration for the scent of its Play-Doh product. While it isn’t impossible to register a trademark for a scent, it is rare, and it is a reminder of the many options business owners have to create connections with customers (and even make a big splash while doing it).

Scent trademarks – and other marks like tastes, colors, sounds, product designs, textures, and even moving images – are part of a larger family of marks often referred to as non-traditional trademarks. The USPTO has issued registrations on all kinds of non-traditional trademarks, including the scent of strawberry for toothbrushes, the “Nationwide is on your side” song for insurance agencies, the word “yummm” sung at the end of Red Robin restaurant commercials, and even a cherry scent for synthetic lubricants.

Registering a non-traditional trademark can help a business protect the exact ways it connects with its consumers. As businesses think more about these non-traditional marks, they may find more ways to set their goods and services apart from their competitors’. These marks can be powerful marketing tools in their own rights as well. For example, Hasbro has earned heaps of free press for its scent registration, and even markets the scent on its own as part of a perfume.

Part of the reason these kinds of trademark registrations are so rare is that they are difficult to get. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that features of a product are never inherently distinctive. As a result, trademark applicants seeking to protect non-traditional trademarks have a high hurdle to clear to show that the scent, taste, color, etc. has acquired distinctiveness and functions as a trademark. Is the purported mark a functional element of the product? Are there third parties using the same mark? Has the mark been used for a long time? Has the mark (not just the underlying product) been advertised by the business or reported on by the media? These are just some of the questions a business must ask about its purported non-traditional marks.

In the end, Hasbro was able to clear this hurdle and was granted a trademark registration for “a scent of a sweet, slightly musky, vanilla fragrance, with slight overtones of cherry, combined with the smell of a salted, wheat-based dough.” Will this registration redefine Hasbro or its Play-Doh product? Probably not. But non-traditional trademarks could help your business mold its marketing efforts into something special, and should be considered as part of any overall branding strategy.

The First Amendment and Trademarks: Protecting “The Thought We Hate”

Can the federal government refuse to register offensive trademarks?  The Supreme Court held yesterday that it cannot.  Although the case did not directly involve the “Washington Redskins” trademark registration, discussed in previous blog articles in this space, it effectively gave the Redskins a victory in their effort to reinstate their trademark registration against efforts to cancel their mark as disparaging.

The Lanham Act governs all federal registration of trademarks.  Since it was enacted in 1946, the Lanham Act has included the “Disparagement Clause,” which prohibits the registration of trademarks “which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”  In Matal v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (2017), a case sure to have wide-ranging effects, the Supreme Court unanimously held the Disparagement Clause unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

The case involves Simon Tam, the lead singer of a band called “The Slants,” who sought federal registration of “THE SLANTS” trademark.  The band chose its name in an attempt to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of stereotypes about its members’ own Asian ethnicities.  The United States Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) rejected Tam’s request to register the mark under the Disparagement Clause, finding “there is . . . a substantial composite of persons who find the term in the applied-for mark offensive.”

The Supreme Court, however, held the rejection of Tam’s registration unconstitutionally discriminated against speech.  The Supreme Court resolved two key issues.  First, it found that trademarks are private speech; not government speech.  Second, the Court ruled that such viewpoint-based discrimination of trademarks is impermissible.

Trademarks are Private, Not Government, Speech

The First Amendment does not regulate government speech.  The general effect of this principle is that the government is not required to give equal time and representation to competing viewpoints when the government itself speaks – in contrast to government regulation of a private person’s speech, which must be viewpoint-neutral.  For example, the government is not required to mount a pro-smoking crusade to balance out its anti-smoking campaign.  In Tam, the PTO argued that the act of approving of a trademark was itself government speech and therefore was not within the reach of the First Amendment.

Justice Alito, writing on behalf of the entire Court, quickly shot down the PTO’s contention, ruling that trademarks are private, not government, speech.  The Court explained that the government does not “dream up” the marks a private party seeks to register: the PTO registers the mark under the Lanham Act based on objective criteria, regardless of the content of the mark.  If registering a trademark is government speech, the Court wrote, then the government is “babbling prodigiously and incoherently” while “expressing numerous contradictory views . . . [and] unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services.”  To hold otherwise would disqualify any speech subject to government registration from First Amendment protection.  This would necessarily include copyright protection, with broad and disturbing implications for the speech expressed in copyright-protected writing, art, music, film, and other content.

The Disparagement Clause Impermissibly Discriminates Based on Viewpoint

Having decided that trademarks are covered by the First Amendment’s free speech protection, the Supreme Court went on to find that the Disparagement Clause embodied an unconstitutional discrimination against speech based on its viewpoint.  Although the Court could not muster a five-member majority to agree on the exact reasoning, the Court unanimously disapproved the refusal to register trademarks based on their perceived offensiveness.

As four members of the Court explained, the Disparagement Clause impermissibly authorized the PTO to “favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”  “Giving offense,” they wrote, “is a viewpoint.” Because the PTO’s refusal to register “The Slants” was to prevent offense, it ran afoul of “the heart of the First Amendment,” which protects “the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”  And because the Disparagement Clause impermissibly went further than necessary to achieve the government’s purported goal of preventing discrimination, it was unconstitutional.  A majority of the Court arguably went further, holding that because the Disparagement Clause impermissibly discriminated based on viewpoint, it was subject either to “heightened” or “strict” scrutiny and was therefore invalid regardless of whether it furthered the prevention of discrimination.

The Effects of Tam

The effects of Tam are likely to be comprehensive and wide-ranging.  In invalidating the Disparagement Clause, the Court ruled the PTO cannot refuse to register a trademark because it is disparaging.  This calls into question whether any viewpoint-based discrimination for a business’s trademarks or copyrights will pass constitutional muster.  Most prominently, it is good news for the embattled Washington Redskins, who were under fire when the PTO previously cancelled their registration based on their mark disparaging Native Americans.

You may know that “aspirin,” the word commonly used to describe acetylsalicylic acid, was once a trademark ­– i.e., brand name – for the acetylsalicylic acid made by one company: Bayer.  The word “aspirin” lost its trademark status because the public came to use the word to mean acetylsalicylic acid made by anyone, not just Bayer.  In trademark-speak, “aspirin” became “generic,” and Bayer’s “aspirin” trademark fell victim to “genericide.”  Other familiar victims of genericide are “cellophane,” “thermos,” and “xerox” (though “xerox” was resurrected through the efforts of the brand owner, Xerox Corporation).

Is “Google” the latest victim of genericide?  Two individuals in a lawsuit in federal court in Arizona claimed it is.  They argued that the public uses “google” as a generic word for the act of searching on the internet (as in, “I googled it”).  They sought to cancel Google’s trademark registration in an effort to defend their registration of hundreds of domain names containing the word “google.”

In Elliott v. Google, No. 15-15809 (9th Cir. May 16, 2017), the Arizona district court rejected the argument that “google” had become generic, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  According to the court, the question is not whether the public sometimes uses “google” generically to refer to an Internet search.  The question is whether the primary significance in the public mind of the word “google” is to identify the act of searching on the Internet or a particular search engine provider.  As long as the primary significance is to identify “who” is providing the service – for example, to distinguish Google from Microsoft (which offers the “Bing” search service) – the mark is safe from genericide. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that “google” had become generic and rejected the effort to cancel Google’s trademark registration.

Proving genericide is difficult.  This case is a reminder, however, that trademark owners – especially those whose product or services become well-known – should be vigilant to ensure the public understands that their trademarks indicate the “who” that provides product or service rather than the product or service itself.